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Abstract
We consider the role of a nonlinear commuting cost function in determina-
tion of the equilibrium commuting pattern where all agents are mobile. Previ-
ous literature has considered only linear commuting cost, where in equilibrium,
all workers are indi¤erent about their workplace location. We show that this
no longer holds for nonlinear commuting cost. The equilibrium commuting
pattern is completely determined by the concavity or convexity of commuting
cost as a function of distance. We show that a monocentric equilibrium ex-
ists when the ratio of the rm agglomeration externality to commuting cost is
su¢ ciently high. Finally, we nd empirical evidence of both long and short
commutes in equilibrium, implying that the commuting cost function is likely
concave.
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1 Introduction
How does the local labor market interact with commuting cost to produce the equi-
librium commuting pattern? In a model with identical commuters, can cross-
commuting, where one commuters path to their job strictly contains another com-
muters path, occur in equilibrium? In fact, Fujita and Thisse (2013, p. 201) state
that in any spatial equilibrium conguration, cross-commuting does not occur.1
We show in this paper that when commuting cost is strictly concave in distance,
cross-commuting is an equilibrium phenomenon.
For an empirical viewpoint, consider the 242 municipalities in the Tokyo Metropol-
itan Area consisting of Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, and Kanagawa prefectures. If we
regress the municipal yearly wage paid by rms in the manufacturing sector in 2012
on a quadratic function of distance of worker residence from Tokyo Station, we have:
wage =  0:0294  distance2 + 1:49  distance+ 429
( 2:26) (1:29) (18:8)
(t-statistics in parentheses)
That is, the wage is decreasing and concave in distance from Tokyo Station. This
is in accord with the ndings of Timothy and Wheaton (2001), where the wage is
increasing and concave in commuting time in Boston and Minneapolis-St. Paul in
1990. We will attempt to explain these phenomena using a simple theoretical model.
In general, the urban labor market interacts with commuting in interesting ways.
For instance, the wage arbitrage condition says that no one can gain by changing her
workplace location, given her residence location. In the literature, this statement is
further specialized to mean that each worker is indi¤erent to her workplace. It is
known that in order to satisfy this condition, one has to assume a linear commuting
cost, as in the previous literature such as Ogawa and Fujita (1980), Fujita and Ogawa
(1982), Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002),2 and Dong and Ross (2015). However,
1We adopt this particular denition of cross-commuting, consistent with Fujita and Thisse
(2013), but to avoid confusion we note that this term has been used in many ways in the literature.
2Although Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg use a time cost of commuting that is exponential in com-
muting distance, by taking logarithms of their equations, for example (3.3) and (3.4), we obtain a
linear wage no-arbitrage equality.
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in reality commuting cost is nonlinear; it is concave if xed costs such as an auto-
mobile purchase are involved, whereas it is convex if long commuting times are very
unpleasant. In these cases, the wage arbitrage condition does not hold, and hence,
given her residence location, each worker strictly prefers the one particular location
for her workplace over others. Thus, there is no guarantee that each worker can nd
a workplace so that the urban spatial labor market clears. Nevertheless, we show in
this paper that when the commuting cost is either strictly convex or strictly concave
in distance, the urban spatial labor market clears. Our paper extends the litera-
ture in that we allow the commuting cost to be nonlinear in distance and derive the
equilibrium commuting pattern explicitly.
To be precise, our theoretical conclusions are as follows. If the commuting cost
function is increasing and convex in distance, then the equilibrium commuting pattern
is exclusively parallel, where every worker commutes the same distance3 and there is
no cross commuting. If the commuting cost function is increasing and concave in
distance, then the equilibrium commuting pattern is exclusively cross commuting.
Our next task in this work is to investigate whether cross commuting occurs in the
real world. More precisely, using commuter ow data from Tokyo, we will empirically
test whether the actual commuting pattern is cross commuting or parallel commuting.
We nd that cross commuting is prevalent.
Our main purpose here is to investigate commuting patterns as a function of
commuting cost, accounting for interactions with the labor market. Hence we sim-
plify other aspects of our urban model. We discuss in the conclusions extensions
to non-monocentric equilibrium urban patterns, and we leave to future work the in-
vestigation of equilibrium under commuting cost functions that are neither convex
nor concave. Analyses of the latter issue involves solving complex systems of equa-
tions, and likely require computer simulations rather than an analytical solution for
tractability reasons.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives our model,
Section 3 presents our theoretical results, whereas Section 4 presents the empirics.
An Appendix contains the longer proofs of results.
3For simplicity of this statement, we implicitly assume that the total land used by all rms and
the total land used by all consumers are the same. Our model is more general than this.
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2 The model
2.1 Preliminaries
We build on Ogawa and Fujita (1980) by extending the model to nonlinear commuting
cost.4 In particular, we consider a city on a line. The equilibrium conguration is
endogenous, but we give conditions su¢ cient for it to be monocentric.5 The locations
of rms and workers are denoted by y and x, respectively. The exogenous mass of
workers is N , whereas the exogenous mass of rms is M . There is one unit of land
available at every location, so this is an example of a linear city. Let composite
consumption good be denoted by z and let s denote quantity of land, sw for workers
and sf for rms. The wage paid by a rm at location y is denoted w(y). The rent
paid per unit by a consumer at location x is denoted by r(x), whereas the rent paid
per unit by a rm at location y is denoted by r(y).
The commuting cost for a consumer living at x but working at y is T (jx  yj) =
t (jx  yj), where t is the commuting cost parameter, (0) = 0 and () is twice con-
tinuously di¤erentiable with 0 > 0. It represents the generalized cost of commuting
between x and y, consisting of both the pecuniary and time costs of commuting. On
the one hand, the pecuniary cost of commuting involves train fares and gasoline prices
and is normally increasing and concave in distance due to the presence of xed costs,
for example the cost of a car or the cost of getting to a train station. It might also be
concave due to a switch in transportation modes under commuter optimization. On
the other hand, the time cost of commuting involves the opportunity cost of time and
fatigue from a long commute.6 Thus, from the perspective of non-pecuniary costs,
the commuting cost function is increasing and convex, especially when commuting
time is prohibitively long. Therefore, the functional form of the generalized cost of
commuting is unknown and subject to empirics.
4Although Ogawa and Fujita (1980) allow endogenous lot sizes for rms in a technical sense, since
output of each rm is assumed to be constant and there is a xed coe¢ cient production technology
in land and labor, in fact the land and labor demand of rms are xed.
5If rms and workers are spatially integrated, then the only possible spatial equilibrium is where
each worker commutes distance 0. In that case, the equilibrium and model are not very interesting
for the purpose of analyzing commuting patterns.
6An exception is Fujita-sensei, who does most of his research on trains.
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To keep the model tractable and our focus on commuting cost, as is common in
this literature, we shall assume that factors are inelastic in supply and demand. This
will be made precise below. Weakening the assumption of xed lot size appears to
make the model analytically intractable, but simulations might be feasible.
2.2 Consumers
Each worker supplies 1 unit of labor inelastically, and will demand sw units of land
inelastically. To obtain this from primitives, we assume that the utility function has
the following form:
U(z; s) =
(
z if s  sw
 1 otherwise
The budget constraint faced by a consumer who lives at x but works at y is:
w(y) = z + r(x)s+ T (jx  yj)
Therefore, if the price of land is positive, the quantity of land consumed by a worker
at x is sw, whereas the consumption of composite good as well as the utility level of
a worker living at x but working at y is z(x; y):
z(x; y) = w(y)  r(x)sw   T (jx  yj)
A worker residing at x and working at y has indirect utility
V (x; y) = z(x; y) = w(y)  r(x)sw   T (jx  yj) (1)
2.3 Producers
Turning to the production side, let Q be rm output and let l be labor input. Recall
that sf is rm land use. The function A(y) is the rm externality, which is increasing
in access to all other rms in the business district. It is specied as
A(y) =    
Z 1
 1
h (y0   y)m(y0)dy0 (2)
where h  0 is continuous and increasing, m(y0) is the endogenous density of rms
at location y0,  is an exogenous parameter representing the strength of the rm
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agglomeration externality, and  will be the maximum amount that can be produced.
Firms will demand N
M
units of labor inelastically and sf units of land inelastically.
To derive this from primitives, the production function of a rm located at y is given
by:
Q(l; s; y) =
(
A(y) if l  N
M
and s  sf
0 otherwise
The prot of a rm locating at y is therefore given by
(y) = A(y)  w(y)l   r(y)s (3)
Therefore, if wages and rents are positive, rms will demand labor l = N
M
and land
s = sf . Then the indirect prot of a rm locating at y is given by
(y) = A(y)  N
M
w(y)  r(y)sf =  (4)
where   0 represents the equilibrium prot of every rm, since rms are free to
choose their locations.
In what follows, we determine the endogenous variables: wages, land use, land
rent, and the commuting pattern.
2.4 Commuting pattern functions and spatial equilibrium
If x and y in the commuting cost function are additively separable (conditional on the
sign of the di¤erence), for example T (x  y) = t  jx  yj as in the previous literature,
then the wage arbitrage condition is met, namely V (x; y) is constant in y for each x.
Hence, it is not di¢ cult to show existence of a spatial equilibrium. However, once the
transport cost function is slightly di¤erent from linear, which is very likely in the real
world, then we can no longer rely on the wage arbitrage condition. In this paper, we
explore spatial equilibrium when the transport cost is nonlinear in distance. In our
framework, indirect utility V (x; y) is given in equation (1). For reference, we shall
call the equilibrium indirect utility level V . Let y = f(x) be the commuting pattern
function indicating that all workers living at x commute to rms locating at y.7
7Implicit in this denition is the idea that all consumers at one location commute to the same
work location. In fact, this will hold in equilibrium.
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At equilibrium, we do not require that indirect utility V is constant for all x and
y, but rather:
V =
M
N

A(f(x))    r(f(x))sf
  r(x)sw   T (jx  f(x)j); 8x 2 R
and
V  w(y)  r(x)sw   T (jx  yj); 8x; y 2 R
The densities of rms and consumers with respect to location will be given by
m(y) and n(x), respectively. The transfer to absentee landlords, who are endowed
with all of the land but obtain utility only from consumption commodity is denoted
by R  0.
Denition 1 An allocation is a list of ve measurable functions and a scalar:
fn(x);m(y); z(x); f(x); A(y);Rg, where the rst three functions all have domain
R and range R+, the fourth and fth functions have domain R and range R, whereas
R  0.
Denition 2 An allocation fn(x);m(y); z(x); f(x); A(y);Rg is called feasible if:
(i)
R1
 1m(y)dy =M;
R1
 1 n(x)dx = N
(ii) m(y)sf + n(y)sw  1 a.s. y 2 R
(iii)
R1
 1A(y)m(y)dy =
R1
 1 [z(x) + T (jx  f(x)j)]n(x)dx+R
(iv) N
M
R
C
m(y)dy =
R
fx2Rjf(x)2Cg n(x)dx for all Lebesgue measurable C  R
(v) A(y) =     R1 1 h (jy0   yj)m(y0)dy0 a.s. y 2 R
The rst condition represents population balance, the second condition represents
material balance in land, the third condition represents material balance in consump-
tion good, the fourth condition represents material balance in labor, whereas the last
condition says that the externality is correct given the distribution of rms.
Denition 3 A spatial equilibrium is a feasible allocation
fn(x);m(y); z(x); f(x); A(y);Rg and a price system fw(y); r(x)g, where w and r are
both measurable functions from R to R+, satisfying the following conditions:
(vi) For almost every x 2 R where n(x) > 0, f(x) solves:
z(x) = max
y
w(y)  r(x)sw   T (jx  yj) + 1
N
Z 1
 1
(y0)m(y0)dy0
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(vii) n(x) > 0 if and only if z(x) = supx02R z(x
0)  0
(viii) m(y) > 0 if and only if (y) = A(y) w(y)N
M
  r(y)sf = supy02R(y0)  0
(ix)
R1
 1 r(x)dx = R  0
The rst condition represents consumer optimization over workplaces, the second
represents consumer optimization over residential location, the third condition rep-
resents producer optimization over locations, whereas the last condition represents
absentee landlord rent collection. For tractability and determinacy reasons, we as-
sume that the consumers own the rms.
Denition 4 We say that a spatial equilibrium fn(x);m(y); z(x); f(x); A(y); Rg, fw(y); r(x)g
is symmetric if all of its component functions (excluding R) are symmetric around 0.
We say that a symmetric spatial equilibrium fn(x);m(y); z(x); f(x); A(y)g, fw(y); r(x)g
is monocentric if there exists b 2 R+ such that m(y) > 0 only if jyj  b, and
n(x) > 0 only if jxj > b.
Assuming a symmetric monocentric conguration with m(y) = 1=sf , we compute
the derivatives of A for future use:
A0(y) =   
sf
[h (b+ y)  h (b  y)] Q 0 for y R 0
A00(y) =   
sf
[h0 (b+ y) + h0 (b  y)] < 0
Denition 5 We say that a symmetric monocentric spatial equilibrium
fn(x);m(y); z(x); f(x); A(y); Rg, fw(y); r(x)g features parallel commuting if
for almost all x; x0 2 R+ with n(x); n(x0) > 0 and x0 > x, then f(x0) > f(x). We say
that a symmetric monocentric spatial equilibrium fn(x);m(y); z(x); f(x); A(y); Rg,
fw(y); r(x)g features cross commuting if for almost all x; x0 2 R+ with n(x); n(x0) >
0 and x0 > x, f(x) > f(x0).
3 Analysis of equilibrium
We distinguish two cases: commuting cost is convex and commuting cost is concave.
First, we perform preliminary calculations that are common to our analysis of both
cases to reduce repetition.
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3.1 Preliminaries
For the purposes of this subsection, the equilibrium is assumed to be symmetric and
monocentric.
Dene R =
R1
 1 r(x)dx. From the material balance condition for consumption
good, let
z(x) = z =
1
N

2
sf
Z b
0
A(y)dy   2
sw
Z B
b
T (x  f(x))dx R

(5)
Eventually, we must and shall specify z and R in terms only of parameters. Next,
we provide informal intuition for the correlation between the second derivative of the
commuting cost function and the commuting pattern.
Each worker residing at x chooses the best location y( x) of a rm. The
consumer optimization problem is specied as:
z = max
y
w(y)  r(x)sw   T (x  y) + 1
N
Z 1
 1
(y0)m(y0)dy0 (6)
with the rst order condition:
w0(y) =  T 0(x  y) =  T 0(f 1(y)  y) (7)
Since the RHS is negative, the wage gradient w0(y) is always negative. That is, the
wage monotonically decreases from the city center y = 0. The higher wage near the
city center o¤sets a longer commute.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the equilibrium is symmetric and monocentric. If the
transport cost function is increasing and convex, then parallel commuting is an equi-
librium commuting pattern. If the transport cost function is increasing and concave,
then cross commuting is an equilibrium commuting pattern.
Proof. Since
w00(y)  T 00(f 1(y)  y) =  T 00(f 1(y)  y)(f 10(y)  1)  T 00(f 1(y)  y)
=  T 00(f 1(y)  y)f 10(y)
the second order condition is
 T 00(f 1(y)  y)f 10(y) < 0 (8)
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If (8) is met for all y, y = f(x) is the global maximizer for every worker at residence
x.
If the transport cost function is strictly convex in distance, then the second order
condition (8) is satised when f 10(y) > 0. On the other hand, if the transport cost
is strictly concave, then (8) is satised when f 10(y) < 0.
Intuition for Proposition 6 is as follows. Please refer to Figure 1. The horizontal
axis is the location of the workers job, y, whereas the vertical axis is in dollars.
Dene
z(y;x) = w(y)  r(x)sw   T (x  y) + 1
N
Z 1
 1
(y0)m(y0)dy0
so that
@z(y;x)
@y
= w0(y) + T 0(x  y)
We have graphed @z(y;x)
@y
in Figure 1. This curve must be downward sloping according
to the second order condition. The rst order condition (7) tells us that where this
curve crosses the horizontal axis at y is the solution to the workers optimization
problem for given residence x. In the case where T is convex, when we increase x, for
each given y, T 0 rises. Hence the @z(y;x)
@y
curve shifts up, represented by the red curve,
and the new optimal job location y+ must be to the right of y
. In other words,
if we look at workers more distant from the rms, they will pay higher commuting
cost. The marginal commuting cost is increasing in distance, so they will choose a job
location closer to the residences even though wages are lower. In the case where T is
concave, when we increase x, for each given y, T 0 falls. Hence the @z(y;x)
@y
curve shifts
down, represented by the green curve, and the new optimal job location y  must be
to the left of y. In other words, if we look at workers more distant from the rms,
they will pay higher commuting cost. The marginal commuting cost is decreasing in
distance, so they will choose a job location farther from the residences where wages
are higher.
The reader might be tempted to infer that in equilibrium, aggregate commuting
cost is minimized and thus the results we have obtained are a simple consequence of
Jensens inequality.8 This is, in fact, incorrect. There is an important externality
between rms that results in the equilibrium phenomenon of agglomeration. There-
fore, the equilibria in this model are generally not Pareto optimal, so they do not
8The intuitive explanation we have just provided in fact motivated our analysis.
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necessarily minimize aggregate commuting cost. For example, it might be possible
to create a Pareto improvement over the equilibrium allocation by pulling rms apart
and inserting consumers. The reduced rm productivity might be o¤set by lower
consumer commuting cost. An important implication is that the technique of solving
for Pareto optimum and decentralizing it cannot be used in the context of our analysis
to nd equilibrium, since an equilibrium is generally not e¢ cient.
Due to the inelastic demand for land, the commuting pattern function will be
linear in both cases described above.9
Set b = Msf
2
, B = Msf
2
+ Nsw
2
, m(y) = 1
sf
for y  b, m(y) = 0 for y > b, n(x) = 0
for x  b, n(x) = 1
sw
for b < x  B, n(x) = 0 for x > B. A(y) is dened by equation
(2) for this density m.
3.2 Convex commuting cost
A monocentric equilibrium exists if the ratio 
t
of the rm agglomeration externality
to the commuting cost is su¢ ciently large:
Proposition 7 If T 00 > 0, for su¢ ciently large 
t
, there exists a symmetric monocen-
tric equilibrium with only parallel commuting. Moreover, this is the only symmetric
monocentric equilibrium allocation.
The proof is in the Appendix. We can see from the proof that the sign of
Msf   Nsw coincides with the signs of the second derivatives of w (y) and r(x) in
the case of T 00 > 0. Since the business district is much smaller than the residential
district in reality, Nsw > Msf holds, and hence the wage and the residential land
rent are decreasing and concave in the distance from the city center. Otherwise,
when Nsw < Msf , they are decreasing and convex. In either case, business land
rent is not necessarily decreasing in distance from the city center.
In order to understand these conditions further, we specify functional forms as
follows: A(y) =   R b b (y   y1)2 dy1 and T (jx  yj) = t (x  y)2. Then, specializing
9The convex and concave commuting cost function cases are, in essence, not symmetric relative
to each other. The reason is that in equilibrium, the set of distances at which we evaluate the
commuting cost functions are di¤erent.
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the calculations in the Appendix to this example, the rst su¢ cient condition for
monocentric spatial equilibrium (27) can be written as
w(x)  (B   x)2 t  (B   b)2 t  b (x  b) (Bx  2bx+ bB) t
(B   b)2 +
M2 (x2   b2) 
N
 0
Since w00(x) > 0, w(x) is convex. Because w(b) = 0, this condition is w0(b) 
0, namely
t  b (B   b)M
2
(B2   2bB + 2b2)N (9)
The second su¢ cient condition for equilibrium can be written as
z(y)   N b  B2 + y2  b2 (B + 2y) By2 + b3 t+M2b2 (B   b)   0
Because z00(y) > 0, z(y) is convex. Since the minimizer of z(y) is negative, this
condition is z(0)  0, namely
t  b (B   b)M
2
(B2   bB + b2)N (10)
The right hand side of equation (9) is larger than that of (10). In fact, we have shown
that the condition su¢ cient for a monocentric spatial equilibrium is given by (10). It
exists when the commuting cost t is small and the face-to-face communication cost 
is large. Substituting b = Msf
2
and B = Msf+Nsw
2
into the right hand side of equation
(10), it can shown that the right hand side of this equation is increasing in M and
decreasing in N . Thus, a monocentric spatial equilibrium exists if the number of
rms is large and the number of workers is small. Whereas the former acts as an
agglomeration force for rms, the latter acts as a dispersion force for workers via the
convexity of the commuting cost function.
3.3 Concave commuting cost
Proposition 8 If T 00 < 0, for su¢ ciently large 
t
, there exists a symmetric mono-
centric equilibrium with only cross commuting. Moreover, this is the only symmetric
monocentric equilibrium allocation.
The proof is in the Appendix. From (7) and (8), the equilibrium wage as a
function of rm location is decreasing and concave in distance from the city center.
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This coincides with the empirical results in Tokyo Metropolitan Area, Boston, and
Minneapolis-St. Paul provided in the introduction. The residential land rent is
decreasing and convex in the distance from the city center. But business land rent
is not necessarily decreasing in distance from the city center.
3.4 Land rent
Proposition 9 Equilibrium residential land rent decreases as distance to the business
district becomes larger. Under the assumption that the total land used for o¢ ces is
smaller than that used for housing: sfM < swN , equilibrium residential land rent
is convex under concave transport cost, whereas it is concave under convex transport
cost.
Proof. From (1), the equilibrium land rent for workers is
r(x) =
1
sw

w(f(x))  T (x  f(x))  V  ; 8x 2 X
Its derivative is
r0(x) =
1
sw
[w0(f(x))f 0(x)  T 0(x  f(x)) (1  f 0(x))]
=   1
sw
T 0(x  f(x)) < 0
where the second equality follows from (7). The second derivative is
r00(x) =   1
sw
T 00(x  f(x)) (1  f 0(x))
Because 1   jf 0(x)j = 1   sfM=swN > 0, the sign of r00(x) is the same that of
 T 00(x  f(x)).
The negative gradient of residential land rent is a well-known equilibrium outcome
in a monocentric city with a spaceless business district. In contrast, rms in our
model use space. According to the empirical literature such as McMillen (1996),
the actual residential land rent is decreasing and convex in the distance from the
city center. Therefore, we conjecture that generalized transport cost of commuting
is concave in distance and the commuting pattern is cross commuting. This is to be
tested statistically in Section 4.
13
We know that A0(y) < 0 since the access to all rms decreases from the city center
and that w0(y) < 0 from (7). Hence, computing r0(y) from (4), we see that the slope
of land rent in the business district can be positive or negative. That is, whereas the
residential land rent monotonically decreases in the distance from the city center, the
business land rent can be non-monotonic.
Given that w0(y) < 0 and that workers cross commute, we can conclude that
the wage received by workers increases with residence distance from the city center.
However, we note that our model assumes inelastic land or housing consumption. If
this is weakened, then the result could be reversed, as demonstrated in Fujita (1991)
Proposition 2.2 in the context of a linear commuting cost function.
4 Empirics
There are many ways to investigate the empirical implications of our model. Indirect
tests would include the prole of rent or wage as a function of distance from the
city center, and commuting distance as a function of distance of residence from the
city center. But note that in our model, we have assumed that all consumers, as
well as all rms, are homogeneous. Controlling for heterogeneity would be a major
problem with respect to all of these indirect empirical tests. For example, we would
expect that education, quality of local schools, and size of household would all a¤ect
choice of residence and thus commuting distance. If we tried to control for these
variables in regressing say commuting distance on distance from the city center, we
would expect an upward sloping function independent of the commuting pattern, be
it parallel commuting, cross commuting, or some combination thereof. Therefore,
we could not distinguish well the commuting pattern. Moreover, once we control
for these other important variables, its not clear that there would be any variance
left to explain. For this reason, we do not employ indirect tests that could rely on
generally available data. Instead, we focus on a direct test of our theory that relies
on individual data on residence and employer location.
In order to test whether parallel commuting or cross commuting is dominant,
we employ data on commuter ows from the 2010 Population Census in Japan. We
extract an origin-destination matrix for 12 municipalities located along the Chuo Line
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commuter railroad out of 62 total municipalities in the Tokyo prefecture. In Figure
2, the 3 light brown municipalities are in the central city whereas the 9 light green
municipalities are suburbs of the central city, for a total of 12 municipalities.
Since we are interested in identifying commuter ows from the suburbs to the
central city, we distinguish between the 9 suburbs (S) and 3 central city municipalities
(C). We have constructed a SC = 93 matrix of commuter ows, whose elements
are denoted by cij. The 9 suburban municipalities and the 3 central city municipalities
are sorted according to the distance from Tokyo station. Roughly speaking, parallel
(respectively, cross) commuting is dominant if the elements near the diagonal, for
example c11, c21, c83 and c93, are larger (respectively, smaller) than those far from the
diagonal, for example c13, c23, c81 and c91. In order to examine this, we conduct a
test of Kendalls  c statistic; see Kendall and Gibbons (1990). The test statistic is:
 c =
q (P  Q)
(q   1)W 2
and the average standard error is
ASE =
2q
(q   1)W 2
"
SX
i=1
CX
j=1
cij (Cij  Dij)2   1
W
(P  Q)2
# 1
2
where
q = minfS;Cg; W =
SX
i=1
CX
j=1
cij
P =
SX
i=1
CX
j=1
cijCij; Q =
SX
i=1
CX
j=1
cijDij
Cij =
SX
h<i
CX
k<j
chk +
SX
h>i
CX
k>j
chk; Dij =
SX
h<i
CX
k>j
chk +
SX
h>i
CX
k>j
chk
It is known that  c=ASE is standard normally distributed (Götas¸ and ·I¸sçi, 2011;
Kendall and Gibbons, 1990).
Using the commuter ow data, we nd that  c =  0:0136 and ASE = 0:00259.
Since  c=ASE =  5:26,  c is negative and signicantly di¤erent from zero, implying
that cross commuting is dominant in the Chuo Line.10 That is, there are many short-
distance commutes between nearby municipalities and many long-distance commutes
10Using data from 1995, we have obtained almost the same result:  c =  0:0149, ASE = 0:00228,
and  c=ASE =  6:54.
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between distant municipalities as compared to intermediate-distance commutes. This
test also suggests that commuting cost is increasing and concave in distance.
5 Conclusion
We have examined equilibrium of a rather standard model, similar to the previous
literature with the exception that we allow general convex or concave commuting cost
as a function of distance. We have shown that a monocentric equilibrium exists if
the ratio of the rm agglomeration externality to the commuting cost is su¢ ciently
large.11 Moreover, when commuting cost is convex, we have the following properties
of equilibrium: residential land rent and business district wages are decreasing and
concave in distance to the CBD, and there is exclusively parallel commuting. When
commuting cost is concave, we have the following: residential land rent is decreas-
ing and convex in distance to the CBD, business district wages are decreasing and
concave in distance to the CBD, and there is exclusively cross commuting.12 The
empirical evidence is broadly consistent with a concave commuting cost function and
cross commuting, in contrast with the statement of Fujita and Thisse cited in the
introduction.13
11In the case where the business district and residential area are xed by zoning, we do not need
to worry about rms moving into the residential area nor about workers moving into the business
district, and our model becomes much simpler. Specically, in the case of T 00 > 0, a su¢ cient
condition for existence of equilibrium is M  A(b)  N  g, whereas for the case of T 00 < 0, a
su¢ cient condition for existence of equilibrium is M  A(b)  N  T (B). Of course, this requires
strong enforcement of zoning and perfect knowledge on the part of the zoning board concerning the
number of rms and consumers as well as their land use. It could well be that the equilibrium with
mobility of agents is not monocentric.
12If the city conguration is not monocentric, we can infer from our work the following commuting
patterns:
(i) The commuting pattern is a replica of the monocentric one in the case of a duocentric or
tricentric conguration.
(ii) There is no commuting in the case of a fully integrated conguration.
(iii) The commuting pattern is a combination of (i) and (ii) in the case of an incompletely integrated
conguration.
13If we were to x the locations of all agents in a monocentric conguration, it would be possible
to recast our commuting pattern function in the context of a continuous two-sided matching or
assignment problem; see Sattinger (1993). In that case, parallel commuting corresponds roughly to
16
It is important to relate our work to the wasteful commuting found in Hamilton
and Röell (1982). Contingent on a version of the classic monocentric city model
with a linear commuting cost, they point out that actual average commuting distance
exceeds optimal average commuting distance by a factor of 8. In fact, in our model,
equilibrium average commuting distance is the same independent of whether the
commuting pattern is parallel commuting or cross commuting. Of course, average
commuting cost will di¤er by commuting pattern and with our function T ; moreover,
the equilibrium commuting pattern depends on the commuting cost. But our model
has nothing to say about equilibrium average commuting distance.
Further work should focus on analyzing the model with even more general com-
muting cost functions, especially those that are neither globally convex nor globally
concave. As a preview, consider a more realistic commuting cost function that is
concave for shorter distances but convex for longer distances, with exactly one inec-
tion point at an intermediate distance. Our conjecture is that there will be cross
commuting for shorter distances but parallel commuting for longer distances, with a
discontinuity in the commuting pattern function at the inection point. Rents and
wages will be continuous but not necessarily di¤erentiable everywhere.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 7
We focus on locations in R+; the prices and allocations for the other locations are
dened symmetrically. The technique of proof that equilibrium exists is guess and
verify. Set b = Msf
2
, B = Msf
2
+ Nsw
2
, m(y) = 1
sf
for y  b, m(y) = 0 for y > b,
n(x) = 0 for x  b, n(x) = 1
sw
for b < x  B, n(x) = 0 for x > B. A(y) is dened
by equation (2) for this density m. For b < x  B, dene
f(x) =
Msf
Nsw
(x  b) (11)
positive assortative matching (in location) whereas cross commuting corresponds roughly to negative
assortative matching. But our problem and model are actually a good deal more complicated than
this. The matching problem neglects both the inter-rm externality as well as the land market and
rents. In essence, in the context of a matching model, our model involves the endogenous choice of
agent characteristic (location) as well as an externality between certain agentschoices.
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The function f is arbitrary otherwise. Hence, for 0  y  b,
f 1(y) =
Nsw
Msf
y + b (12)
For x > B, dene r(x) = 0.
There are two cases to consider:
(i) Nsw 6= Msf . We shall nd an explicit expression for equilibrium rent on the
portion of the city where consumers live. This involves integrating (7), plugging
back into equation (6) to eliminate w(y), and solving for r(x) using the fact that rent
must be 0 at the boundary of the city. The details are as follows:
Integrating (7), we obtain
w(y) =  
Z
T 0(f 1(y)  y)dy
=   Msf
Nsw  Msf T

Nsw  Msf
Msf
y + b

+ Ca
=   b
B   2bT
 
f 1(y)  y+ Ca (13)
where Ca is the constant of integration.
From (6) and (13),
r(x) =
1
sw
[w(y)  T (x  y)  z]
=
1
sw

  b
B   2bT
 
f 1(y)  y+ Ca   T (x  y)  z
=
1
sw

  B   b
B   2bT (x  f(x)) + Ca   z

Setting Cb =
1
sw
(Ca   z) ,
=   N
2 (B   2b)T (x  f(x)) + Cb (14)
Since r(B) = 0, (14) leads to
Cb =
N
2 (B   2b)T (B   b)
Plugging Cb into (14) yields our ultimate expression for rent (17) below.
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(ii) Nsw =Msf . We have
w(y) =  
Z
T 0(f 1(y)  y)dy
=  
Z
T 0

Nsw
Msf
y + b  y

dy
=  
Z
T 0 (b) dy
=  T 0 (b) y + Cc (15)
where Cc is again a constant of integration. From (6) and (15),
r(x) =
1
sw
[w(y)  T (x  y)  z]
=
1
sw
[ T 0 (b) y + Cc   T (x  y)  z]
=
1
sw

 T 0 (b)Msf
Nsw
(x  b) + Cc   T (B   b)  z

=
1
sw
[ T 0 (b)x+ Cd]
where Cd = bT 0 (b) + Cc   T (B   b)  z. Since r(B) = 0, we obtain
r(x) =
1
sw
T 0 (b) (B   x) (16)
Having analyzed both cases, we can summarize as follows:
For b < x  B, dene
r(x) =
(
N
2(B 2b) [T (B   b)  T (x  f(x))] if Nsw 6=Msf
N
2(B b)T
0 (b) (B   x) if Nsw =Msf
(17)
Let Rw = 2
Z B
b
r(x)dx
For 0  y  b, dene
w(y) = z + r(f 1(y))sw + T (f 1(y)  y) (18)
Using the prot function (4) and the fact that the rent for consumers and producers
must be equal at b,
For 0  y  b, dene
r(y) =
1
sf

A(y)  A (b) + N
M
[w (b)  w(y)]

+ C1 (19)
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where
C1 
(
N
2(B 2b) [T (B   b)  T (b)] if Nsw 6=Msf
N
2
T 0 (b) if Nsw =Msf
(20)
is a function of only exogenous parameters.
(i) If we substitute (13) into (19), we have
r(y) =
1
sf

A(y)  A (b) + N
M

w (b) +
b
B   2bT
 
f 1(y)  y  Ca+ C1
=
1
sf

A(y) +
N
M
b
B   2bT
 
f 1(y)  y+ C2
Using the fact that r(y) = r(x) evaluated at y = x = b,
C2    N
2 (B   2b)T (b) 
M
2b
A (b)
(ii) If we substitute (15) into (19), we get
r(y) =
1
sf

A(y)  A (b) + N
M
[w (b) + T 0 (b) y   Cc]

+ C1
=
M
2b

A(y) +
N
M
T 0 (b) y

+ C2
Using the fact that r(y) = r(x) evaluated at y = x = b,
C2   M
2b
A (b)
Hence,
r(y) =
(
M
2b

A(y)  A (b) + N
M
b
B 2b [T (f
 1(y)  y)  T (b)] if Nsw 6=Msf
M
2b

A(y)  A (b) + N
M
T 0 (b) y

if Nsw =Msf
(21)
Let
Rf = 2
Z b
0
r(y)dy
Then R = Rf +Rw, a function of only exogenous parameters. So z can be found as
only a function of exogenous parameters by plugging R into (5). In addition, w(y)
(0  y  b) is a function of only exogenous variables by using (18).
Notice that (4) and (19) imply that prots are constant on 0  y  b, namely
(y) =  = A (b)  N
M
w (b)  sfC1 (22)
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Hence,
For 0  y  b, dene
w(y) =
M
N

A(y)    r(y)sf

To show that this represents an equilibrium, we must verify that   0, z  0, that
no consumer wishes to move to [0; b], and that no rm wants to move to (b;1).
In the case of T 00 > 0 and Nsw 6=Msf ,14 the total land rent is
R = Rf +Rw = 2
Z b
0
r(y)dy + 2
Z B
b
r(x)dx
=
M
b
Z b
0
A(y)  A (b) + N
M
b
B   2b

T
 
f 1(y)  y  T (b) dy
+
N
B   2b
Z B
b
[T (B   b)  T (x  f(x))] dx
=
M
b
Z b
0
A(y)  A (b) dy + N
B   2b
Z B
b
[T (x  f(x))  T (b)] b
B   bdx
+
N
B   2b
Z B
b
[T (B   b)  T (x  f(x))] dx
=
M
b
Z b
0
A(y)  A (b) dy   N
B   b
Z B
b
T (x  f(x)) dx+Ng
where dy = Msf
Nsw
dx = b
B bdx and
g  1
B   2b [(B   b)T (B   b)  bT (b)]
which is positive for all b 6= B=2. So (5) can be rewritten as
z =
1
N

M
b
Z b
0
A(y)dy   N
B   b
Z B
b
T (x  f(x))dx R

=
1
N
"
M
b
R b
0
A(y)dy   N
B b
R B
b
T (x  f(x))dx  M
b
R b
0
A(y)  A (b) dy
+ N
B b
R B
b
T (x  f(x)) dx Ng
#
=
M
N
A (b)  g
The condition for spatial equilibrium is z  0 or
MA (b)  Ng (23)
14The case Nsw =Msf is similar.
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(i) First, we show that no rm will want to move to the residential area. Suppose
a rm deviates from the business district y 2 [0; b] to the residential district x 2 (b; B].
We compute the wage w(x) that makes a worker indi¤erent if she resides at x1 2 [b; B]
but shifts her workplace from y 2 [0; b] to x 2 [b; B]. We focus on the case: x  x1.
The case x > x1 can be ruled out because a worker residing at x1 = x   must pay
higher land rent than a worker residing at x1 = x+ for all  > 0 due to negative rent
gradient r(x) in the residential district. That is, the latter worker always achieves
a higher utility level, since compared to the former, their wages are the same, their
land rent is lower, and their commuting cost is the same. So if a consumer residing
at x1 = x    is happier, so is a consumer residing at x1 = x + . Hence we focus
only on the case: x1 2 [x;B].
If she works at y = f(x1) 2 [0; b], in equilibrium her consumption of composite
good is the same as the consumer who lives at B:
zb = w(f(x1))  r(x1)sw   T (x1   f(x1)) + 1
N
Z 1
 1
(y0)m(y0)dy0
= w(b)  T (B   b) + 1
N
Z 1
 1
(y0)m(y0)dy0
from (6). On the other hand, if she works at x 2 [b; B], her consumption of composite
good is
za = w(x)  r(x1)sw   T (x1   x) + 1
N
Z 1
 1
(y0)m(y0)dy0
In order to guarantee equal utility, these two consumptions should be the same zb =
za. That is, the wage o¤ered by a rm at location x for a worker at location x1
should be
w(x) = w(b)  T (B   b) + r(x1)sw + T (x1   x)
Then, the prot of a rm relocating from y to x and paying this wage w(x) for a
worker living at x1 is
(x; x1) = A(x)  N
M
w(x)  r(x)sf
= A(x)  N
M
[w(b)  T (B   b) + r(x1)sw + T (x1   x)]  r(x)sf (24)
For equilibrium, this prot does not exceed , which was obtained before relocation:
(x; x1)  ; 8b  x  x1  B (25)
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We have
@(x; x1)
@x1
=
N
M
[T 0 (x1   f(x1))  T 0 (x1   x)] > 0
because x1   f(x1) > x1   x and T 00 (x) > 0. This implies x1 = B is the maximizer
of (x; x1). Hence, the no-deviation condition (25) is replaced with
(x;B)  ; 8x 2 (b; B] (26)
which can be rewritten as
M
N
[A(b)  A (x)] + [T (B   x)  T (B   b)] + b
B 2b [T (b)  T (x  f(x))]  0 if Nsw 6=Msf
M
N
[A(b)  A(x)] + [T (B   x)  T (B   b)] + b
B bT
0 (b) (b  x)  0 if Nsw =Msf
(27)
for all x 2 (b; B] by using (17) and (24). Observe that the term in the rst brack-
ets is positive, whereas those in the second and third brackets are negative from
sgn [T (b)  T (x  f(x))] =  sgn (B   2b). Condition (27) is rewritten as

t
 max
y; y1
F1(x; sf ; sw;M;N), where
F1(x; sf ; sw;M;N) 
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Nsf
M
Msf
Nsw Msf
h
(x f(x)) 

Msf
2
i
 

Nsw
2
+
Msf
2
 x

+(Nsw2 )R Msf
2
 Msf2
h(x y0) h

Msf
2
 y0

dy0
if Nsw 6=Msf
Nsf
M
Msf
Nsw
h
 T 0

Msf
2

Msf
2
 x
i
 

Nsw
2
+
Msf
2
 x

+(Nsw2 )R Msf
2
 Msf2
h(x y0) h

Msf
2
 y0

dy0
if Nsw =Msf
and G1 is nite and di¤erentiable with respect to x 2 (b; B]. Condition (27) is stricter
than condition (23) because plugging x = B into (27) yields
M [A(b)  A (B)]  Ng
where A (B) > 0.
(ii) Second, we consider no deviation condition of a worker. Suppose a worker
deviates to from the residential district x 2 [b; B] to the business district y 2 [0; b).
The consumption of composite good before deviation was
zb(y) = w(y)  r(f 1(y))sw   T
 
f 1(y)  y+ 1
N
Z 1
 1
(y0)m(y0)dy0
On the other hand, the consumption of composite good after deviation is
za(y; y1) = w(y)  r(y1)sw   T (jy   y1j) + 1
N
Z 1
 1
(y0)m(y0)dy0
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Let y1 = y1 be the maximizer of za(y; y1). For a symmetric monocentric spatial
equilibrium, the consumption of composite good before deviation is not smaller than
that after deviation. That is,
zb(y)  za(y; y1); 8y 2 [0; b) (28)
or
min
y1
[r(y1)sw + T (jy   y1j)]  r(f 1(y))sw   T
 
f 1(y)  y (29)
for all y 2 [0; b). Condition (29) is rewritten as

t
 max
y; y1
F2(y; y1; sf ; sw;M;N),
where F2(y; y1; sf ; sw;M;N)

8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
s2f
sw
Nsw
Nsw Msf
h


Msf
2

+(Nsw2 ) (f 1(y1) y1)
i
 (jy y1j)  MsfNsw Msf (f
 1(y) y)
R Msf
2
 Msf2
h

Msf
2
 y0

 h(jy0 y1j)dy0
if Nsw 6=Msf
sf
sw
 Nsw
Msf


Msf
2

y1+
0

Msf
2

Msf
2
+Nsw
2
 f 1(y)

 (jy y1j)+(f 1(y) y)
R Msf
2
 Msf2
h

Msf
2
 y0

 h(jy0 y1j)dy0
if Nsw =Msf
Hence, the su¢ cient conditions for a symmetric monocentric spatial equilibrium is
given by (27) and (29).
Next, we show that there is no cross commuting in any symmetric, monocentric
equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium specied above is the only one.
In equilibrium, for a worker residing at x to weakly prefer commuting to y instead
of ey, the following should hold:
w (y)  T (jx  yj)  w (ey)  T (jx  eyj)
In equilibrium, for a worker residing at ex to weakly prefer commuting to ey instead of
y, the following should hold:
w (y)  T (jex  yj)  w (ey)  T (jex  eyj)
Hence,
'(x) = T (jex  yj) + T (jx  eyj)  T (jx  yj)  T (jex  eyj)  0 (30)
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should hold for all x.
Suppose that there is cross commuting. Then for some ey < y  x < ex, we have
'0(x) = T 0 (x  ey)  T 0 (x  y)
This is positive because x   ey > x   y and T 00(x) > 0. We also get '(ex) = 0, and
thus '(x) < 0 for all x < ex, which contradicts '(x)  0.
Hence there is only parallel commuting at a symmetric, monocentric equilibrium.
Thus, we conclude that the only such equilibrium is the one we have specied.
Proof of Proposition 8
Similar to the previous proof, we focus on locations in R+. The technique of
proof that equilibrium exists is guess and verify. For b < x  B, dene
f(x) =
Msf
Nsw
(B   x) (31)
The function f is arbitrary otherwise. Hence, for 0  y  b,
f 1(y) = B   Nsw
Msf
y
For x > B, dene r(x) = 0.
Integrating (7), we obtain:
w(y) =  
Z
T 0(f 1(y)  y)dy
=  
Z
T 0

B   B
b
y

dy
=
b
B
T
 
f 1(y)  y+ Ca (32)
where once again Ca is a constant of integration.
From (6) and (32),
r(x) =
1
sw
[w(y)  T (x  y)  z]
=
1
sw

 B   b
B
T (x  f(x)) + Ca   z

Setting Cb =
1
sw
(Ca   z)
=   N
2B
T (x  f(x)) + Cb (33)
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Observe that the residential land rent is decreasing and convex in x.
Since r(B) = 0 in (33), we get
Cb =
N
2B
T (B)
Plugging Cb into (33) yields our nal expression for rent (34):
For b < x  B, dene
r(x) =
N
2B
[T (B)  T (x  f(x))] (34)
Using the prot function and the fact that the rent for consumers and producers must
be equal at b,
For 0  y  b, dene
r(y) =
1
sf

A(y)  A (b) + N
M
[w (b)  w(y)]

+
N
2B
T (B) (35)
If we substitute (32) into (35), we obtain
r(y) =
1
sf

A(y)  A (b) + N
M

w (b)  b
B
T
 
f 1(y)  y  Ca+ N
2B
T (B)
Using r(y) = r(x) evaluated at y = x = b, we obtain
r(y) =
M
2b
[A(y)  A (b)]  N
2B

T
 
f 1(y)  y  T (B) (36)
Then R = Rf +Rw, a function of only exogenous parameters. So z can be found as
only a function of exogenous parameters by plugging R into (5). In addition, w(y)
(0  y  b) is a function of only exogenous variables by using (18).
Notice that (4) and (36) imply that prots are constant on 0  y  b, namely
(y) =  = A (b)  N
M
w (b)  Nb
MB
T (B)
Hence,
For 0  y  b, dene
w(y) =
M
N

A(y)    r(y)sf

To show that this represents an equilibrium, we must verify that   0, z  0, that
no consumer wishes to move to [0; b], and that no rm wants to move to (b;1).
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As in the previous proof, we verify that what we have constructed is an equilib-
rium. In the case of T 00 < 0, the total land rent is
Rf +Rw = 2
Z b
0
r(y)dy + 2
Z B
b
r(x)dx
=
Z b
0
M
b
[A(y)  A (b)] dy + N
B   b
Z B
b
[T (B)  T (x  f(x))] dx
So (5) can be rewritten as
z =
1
N

M
b
Z b
0
A(y)dy   N
B   b
Z B
b
T (x  f(x))dx R

=
M
N
A (b)  T (B)
The condition for spatial equilibrium is then given by
MA (b)  NT (B) (37)
which is similar to (23).
(i) First, we seek no deviation condition of a rm. Suppose a rm deviates to from
y 2 [0; b] to x 2 (b; B]. We compute the wage w(x) that makes a worker indi¤erent
if she residing at x1 2 [b; B] shifts her workplace from y 2 [0; b] to x 2 [x1; B]. As
before, we can focus on the interval of x1 2 [x;B].
If she works at y = f(x1), her consumption of composite good is
zb = w(f(x1))  r(x1)sw   T (x1   f(x1)) = w(0)  T (B) + 1
N
Z 1
 1
(y0)m(y0)dy0
On the other hand ,if she works at x, her consumption of composite good is
za = w(x)  r(x1)sw   T (x1   x) + 1
N
Z 1
 1
(y0)m(y0)dy0
Because zb = za for equal utility, the wage o¤ered by a rm at location x for a worker
at location x1 should satisfy
w(x; x1) = w(0)  T (B) + r(x1)sw + T (x1   x)
The prot of a rm relocating from y to x is
(x; x1) = A(x)  N
M
w(x; x1)  r(x)sf
= A(x)  N
M
[w(0)  T (B) + r(x1)sw + T (x1   x)]  r(x)sf
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The no-deviation condition is given by
(x; x1)  ; 8b  x; x1  B
We have
@(x; x1)
@x1
=
N
M
[T 0 (x1   f(x1))  T 0 (x1   x)] > 0
because x1   f(x1) > x1   x and T 00 (x) > 0. This implies x1 = B is the minimizer
of (x; x1). Hence, the no-deviation condition (25) is replaced with
(x;B)  ; 8x 2 (b; B] (38)
We have
(x;B) = A(x)  N
M
[w(0)  T (B) + T (B   x)]  r(x)sf
= A(x)  A(0) + Nb
MB
[T (x  f(x))  T (B)] +  + N
M
[T (B)  T (B   x)]
Then, (38) can be rewritten as
M
N
[A(0)  A (x)] + [T (B   x)  T (B)] + b
B
[T (B)  T (x  f(x))]  0 (39)
for all x 2 (b; B]. This is rewritten as

t
 max
y; y1
G1(x; sf ; sw;M;N)
where G1(x; sf ; sw;M;N)
 Nsf
M
Nsw
Nsw+Msf


Nsw
2
+
Msf
2

+
Msf
Nsw+Msf
 (x  f(x))  

Nsw
2
+
Msf
2
  x

RMsf=2
 Msf=2 h (jy0j) + h (x  y0) dy0
and G1 is nite and di¤erentiable with respect to x 2 (b; B].
If we plug x = B into (39), we get
M [A(0)  A (B)] NT (B)  0
which is stricter than the previous condition (37).
(ii) Second, we consider no deviation condition of a worker. Suppose a worker
deviates to from x 2 [b; B] to y1 2 [0; b). The consumption of composite good before
deviation was
zb(y) = w(y)  r(f 1(y))sw   T
 
f 1(y)  y
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On the other hand, the consumption of composite good after deviation is
za(y; y1) = w(y)  r(y1)sw   T (jy   y1j)
Let y1 = y1 be the maximizer of za(y; y1). For a symmetric monocentric spatial
equilibrium, the consumption of composite good before deviation is not smaller than
that after deviation. That is,
zb(y)  za(y; y1); 8y 2 [0; b)
or
min
y1
[r(y1)sw + T (jy   y1j)]  r(f 1(y))sw   T
 
f 1(y)  y  0 (40)
for all y 2 [0; b). This is rewritten as

t
 max
y; y1
G2(y; y1; sf ; sw;M;N)
where G2(y; y1; sf ; sw;M;N)
 s
2
f
sw
Msf
Nsw+Msf
 (f 1(y)  y) + Nsw
Nsw+Msf
 (f 1(y1)  y1)   (jy   y1j)RMsf=2
 Msf=2 h (jy0   y1j) + h (Msf=2  y0) dy0
and G2 is nite and di¤erentiable with respect to y, y1 2 [0; b).
Hence, the conditions for a symmetric monocentric spatial equilibrium is given by
(39) and (40).
Next, we show that there is no cross commuting in any symmetric, monocentric
equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium specied above is the only one.
In equilibrium, for a worker residing at x to prefer commuting to y instead of ey,
the following should hold:
w (y)  T (jx  yj)  w (ey)  T (jx  eyj)
In equilibrium, for a worker residing at ex to prefer commuting to ey instead of y, the
following should hold:
w (y)  T (jex  yj)  w (ey)  T (jex  eyj)
Hence,
'(x) = T (jex  yj) + T (jx  eyj)  T (jx  yj)  T (jex  eyj)  0 (41)
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should hold for all x.
Suppose that there is parallel commuting. Then for some y < ey  x < ex, we
have
'0(x) = T 0 (x  ey)  T 0 (x  y) > 0
because x  ey < x  y and T 00(x) < 0. We also have '(ex) = 0, and thus '(x) < 0 for
all x < ex, which contradicts '(x)  0.
Hence there is only cross commuting at a symmetric, monocentric equilibrium.
Thus, we conclude that the only such equilibrium is the one we have specied.
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Figure 1:  Determination of the commuting pattern 
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